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*I.P.Q. 311 More than 80 per cent of the world's population lives in developing countries where
communicable diseases account for 50 per cent of the disease burden.1 The opening Recital of World
Health Organization's Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Property affirms the need to construct a sustainable basis for research and development relevant to
diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries.2 Regrettably, the factors that drive
pharmaceutical innovation are often biased against the kinds of diseases that are disproportionately
found in low-income countries.3 Innovation to address diseases primarily affecting the poor *I.P.Q.
312 is impeded by a combination of under-investment by the public sector and market failure.4
WHO Member States recognise that the global network of universities and publicly funded research
institutions have a key role to play in the research and development (R & D) of medicines for
neglected diseases, frequently in partnership with the private sector.5 The Bayh-Dole model of
technology transfer6 encourages PROs to seek patent protection for inventionsmade using public
funds and to license those inventions to the pharmaceutical industry with the goal of promoting their
commercialisation and public availability.7
However, in view of the long duration and high cost of innovation, when negotiating with a university
patentee pharmaceutical companies will normally seek an exclusive patent licence.8 The grant of an
exclusive licence confers powers on the licensee that are equivalent to those of the proprietor insofar
as it permits only the licensee and persons authorised by the licensee to exploit the invention.9 Under
international patent *I.P.Q. 313 law this gives the licensee exclusive rights of manufacture and sale of
the invention for a 20-year term to the exclusion of the patentee.10 An exclusive licence will also
exclude the licensor from using the invention. For example, assume that in 2000, the University of
Distopia received a patent for a new vaccine against tuberculosis. Two years later the university
granted an exclusive licence to Pharmco to develop and test the product. In 2009, almost 10 years
after obtaining the patent, the vaccine is given regulatory approval. On the one hand, without
exclusive access to the technology, Pharmco might not be prepared to take the risk of investing the
resources necessary to develop the vaccine into a marketable product. The major pharmaceutical
companies consider the market exclusivity and higher prices made possible by patent protection
particularly important, owing to the large investment in research and clinical testing required prior to
sale, and because the actual manufacturing process is relatively cheap and easy to replicate.11
On the other hand, there is considerable debate about whether PROs should grant Pharmco an
exclusive licence thereby potentially limiting further research and restricting dissemination of the
technology.12 The problem is that an exclusive licence to Pharmco, without due consideration of future
development, tends to inhibit the ability of PROs to have a meaningful role in monitoring the
development and future use of health technology. A recent illustrative response is to be found in the
proposed changes to the Regulations accompanying South Africa's Intellectual Property Rights from
Publicly Financed Research and Development Act,13 which would see funding recipients having to
ensure that before granting an exclusive licence, the agreement contains terms requiring the licensee
to provide a development plan and to ensure that the benefits of the intellectual property are
reasonably accessible to the people of the Republic.14
As the South African proposal indicates, depending upon the goals and expectations with which the
parties negotiate terms, there is considerable flexibility within the licensing agreement. The
intersection of property and contract law provides an opportunity for university licensors in leading
developing countries to reclaim the policy space needed in overcoming obstacles associated with
pharmaceutical R & D. Given the importance of licensing to the development and availability of new
products, licensing should be governed by terms that seek to meet commercialisation benchmarks; to
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keep the licensed technology reasonably accessible to researchers; and *I.P.Q. 314 to modify or
terminate the contract if the public's reasonable health care needs are not met.
This article advances various licensing strategies that would allow universities and public research
organisations15 (PROs) to negotiate with business partners in order to obtain the optimal development
of pharmaceutical products. It aims to identify the goals of licensing policy for PROs in developing
countries; and to examine the kinds of restriction and reservation clauses that PROs should consider
including in patent licensing agreements. By such means, the author argues, developing countries
can achieve a more appropriate balance between the needs of the pharmaceutical industry for patent
protection and those of PROs to disseminate knowledge as broadly as possible among the research
community.
In the exposition of this argument, this article is organised as follows: the first part examines various
models of technology transfer from university to the business sector, in relation to patent licensing by
universities in developing countries. The second part explains how public-private partnerships for
drug development with universities and health institutes in developing countries, has been facilitated
by the restructuring of the pharmaceutical industry and the entry of new manufacturing companies
from India and China. The third part explains how universities in developing countries might utilise a
mix of exclusive and non-exclusive licences in order to promote R & D. The fourth part offers drafting
guidelines for restriction clauses as to field of use, territory and rights to improvements, in the light of
European competition law. The fifth part explains the legal status and importance of negotiating
exemptions for research and experiment use. The sixth part provides guidance for the drafting of
reservation clauses for publication and access rights to scientific data. The article concludes with a
recommendation for a termination clause in the licensing agreement capable of preserving rights
negotiated for the use and dissemination of research.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM UNIVERSITY TO INDUSTRY IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
The modern university has become an important source for the direct application of scientific research
to identifiable and pressing needs inmedicine and the health sciences; and for the patenting of those
inventions. Today, PROs play a crucial role in promoting the R & D of pharmaceuticals at each stage
of the process, from the exchange of scientific data16 and personnel, to the facilitation of public-private
partnerships for clinical trials *I.P.Q. 315 and product manufacture.17 However, questions remain
concerning the ostensible conflict of interests between the mission of PROs to conduct basic research
in the public interest and those of the private sector to commercialise the results of publicly funded
research. This debate becomes all the more acute in the case of developing countries, where
questions arise as to the appropriatemodel for university-industry licensing. The author will begin with
an appraisal of the Bayh-Dole model and its alternatives, before considering the relevance of these
models to university-industry technology transfer in developing countries.
The Bayh-Dole Model
The United States Bayh-Dole Act of 198018 established the “licensing” model of technology transfer
from universities to the private sector.With the aim of encouraging the development of technologies
based on university research, the Bayh-Dole legislation allows universities to patent inventions arising
from publicly funded research. By this means universities may retain ownership rights over
government funded research and license inventions on a non-exclusive or exclusive basis.19 The
Bayh-Dole model requires universities establish a centralised technology transfer office (TTO) for the
development and commercialisation of research. The TTOs are responsible for evaluating inventions,
filing for patent applications on behalf of the university and finding a suitable licensee within the
business sector.20
*I.P.Q. 316 The focus of the Bayh-Dole model is to transfer title from individual researchers to
PROs.21 It is a patent-centric model of R & D,22 characterised by the diligent filing of applications and
the retention of ownership rights for transfer to the private sector through licensing. The 20-year term
of patent protection permits prices that are higher than the marginal price of manufacturing. This
exclusivity is said to constitute an incentive for the initial research and development of new health
products.23 The harm flowing from lessening competition by means of imitation is said to be
outweighed by the advantage flowing from more innovation.24
When it comes to making investments in order to transform the university-generated knowledge about
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neglected diseases into a commercial application, the notional incentive becomes problematic.25 The
notion that patent protection would provide a financial incentive to drug firms to invest for tropical
diseases has not materialised. The redistribution of resources to the private sector accompanied by
the introduction of patents will not alone trigger the development of more drugs specifically related to
the needs of the poor.26 Even the relative boost in research and development for antiretroviral therapy
is due to the fact that epidemics also involve developed countries. There is said to be a market failure
for medicines in developing countries. Low-income countries do not constitute a market capable of
inducing patent-driven investment.27 In the majority of countries in Africa the profits have not existed
to attract commercial development and public funding for diseases has been difficult to obtain and
sustain.28
*I.P.Q. 317 The Bayh-Dole model rests on the tidy hypothesis that innovation should spur a virtuous
circle, generating revenue that can be applied to more basic research.29 This combination raises
concerns about the appropriate balance between pure and applied research. Concerns are expressed
about the impact of rights to the exclusive use of patented medical technologies, as well as
obligations to retain the confidentiality of research, on the public domain of science.30 The
single-minded promotion of the downstream application of university research potentially conflicts with
policies favouring full and open access to research data. Yet the open science model is considered to
be one of the main reasons why research universities have been so important in the process of
economic growth.31 From the development of penicillin to the invention of recombinant DNA
technology, research universities have spurred innovation. By its nature, the entrepreneurial model
sparks misgivings that pressure to reap the financial fruit of patenting medical science will deflect
universities from their traditional mission, the discovery and dissemination of new knowledge.
Variations of the Bayh-Dole model
The EU innovation model
In 2004 the European Commission published a report on themanagement of intellectual property in
PROs that recommended an innovation model of technology transfer in parallel with an open science
model.32 The Report recognised that the US “licensing” model was not entirely appropriate to the
prevailing conditions for R & D in the EU, primarily because of a more fragmented market and a lower
density of research based companies headquartered in Europe. Instead, the Report advocated an
interactive “Innovation Model” in which the pure licensing model is supplemented by “a more active
policy of collaborative research with industry” and by “a pro-active involvement in the creation of
spinout companies”.33 Even so, the licensing and innovation models share a common character, in so
far as they both advocate the PROs' ownership and strategic management of the intellectual property
deriving from their research results.
Most OECD countries have adopted “Bayh-Dole style” models of technology transfer.34 In the more
technologically advanced developing countries there is also *I.P.Q. 318 evidence that governments
are willing to legislate to ensure that intellectual property resulting from publicly financed research is
disclosed, appropriately protected and commercialised for the benefit of the nation. For example,
India's Council of Scientific and Industrial Research pursues a policy of patenting inventions, and
China also encourages patenting by its universities and research institutions.35 Most recently, the
South African Government has proposed the creation of a National Intellectual Property Management
Office to oversee the transfer and commercialisation of university research.36 Nevertheless, in the
case of middle to lower-income developing countries questions concerning the feasibility of the
Bayh-Dole model remain particularly pertinent.
The WIPO “IP Hub”
For less technologically advanced developing countries, regional technology transfer hubs may prove
a more viable model for strengthening R & D.37 Developing countries, including Cameroon, Chad and
Colombia, have benefited from a pilot project launched by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) in 2004, which established two networks of health research institutions in Africa
and South America each with its own “IP Hub”.38 Participating research institutions agreed to common
policies and to share technology transfer services in order to minimise costs and optimise resources
through economies of scale. The “IPHubs” offer intellectual property services including, managing and
licensing patents owned by the research institutions and marketing the patent portfolio of the R & D
network with a view to attracting further funding and promoting public-private partnerships.
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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
The WHO Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property stresses the need for
co-operation between public and private sectors to boost pharmaceutical innovation in developing
countries and to facilitate the dissemination and use of research *I.P.Q. 319 and development
outcomes.39 This action is consistent with studies by the OECD which have concluded that greater
use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) can enhance the efficiency of innovation by securing private
finance and expertise for the development of publicly funded research.40 Public-private partnerships,
varying from small groups to more complex consortia between PROs, international organisations and
private companies, have become a major source of new drug development for developing countries.
For example, the World Health Organization's Special Programme for Research and Training in
Tropical Diseases facilitates a partnership-oriented approach to drug discovery and development
between public-sector organisations and private companies that permits projects to be launched with
cost-effective budgets.41
Scientific collaboration between PROs in developed and developing countries has been expanding
since the 1980s. In addition, South-South collaboration is becoming an increasingly important
element in R & D, providing opportunities for the development of pharmaceuticals that are tailored to
meet local needs.42 PRO partnerships in Africa might include a mix of institutions with well-established
research activities as well as promising institutions that are developing their research potential.
Theway inwhich the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) evolved is instructive for the
development of PROs in other developing countries. It developed from a long-term partnership
between KEMRI and the Welcome Trust.43 This partnership is fully integrated *I.P.Q. 320 into the
KEMRI research infrastructure. The KEMRI-Welcome Trust partnership is embeddedwithin Kilifi
District Hospital, building its research programmes around local medical infrastructure and
contributing to healthcare delivery. KEMRI has developed collaborative links with a large number of
regional and international collaborations including institutions such as National Institute of Medical
Research in Tanzania and the British Medical Research Council.44
The example of KEMRI confirms the trend towards the locus of innovation in pharmaceuticalsmoving
beyond the confines of central R & D laboratories of the largest companies and spreading outwards to
PROs, notably universities and their private sector partners in the industry.45 The contention that
university patent ownership will facilitate technology transfer from universities to private firms begins
to have some substance when we consider first, the restructuring of the changing business model of
the major pharmaceutical industry and, secondly, new entrants to pharmaceutical manufacturing from
developing countries as potential business partners.
Restructuring Big Pharma's business model
The major pharmaceutical industry has acknowledged that the prevailing model, largely based on a
vertical or fully integrated pharmaceutical companies (FIPCO), model is incapable of delivering
sustainable growth. While the business climate for pharmaceutical companies has changed
dramatically in the past five years, their business model has not kept pace. The pharmaceutical
industry is facing a radical transition because the old business model shows diminishing returns.46
Declining R & *I.P.Q. 321 D productivity, rising costs of commercialisation, increasing purchaser
influence and shorter exclusivity periods have driven up the average cost in launching new products
and reduced average expected returns on new investment.
The major pharmaceutical companies need a new business model to restore sound financial results.
They are likely to transition to greater reliance on partnerships to manage risk and return, across both
product pipelines and functions.47 In the result, structural changes in the pharmaceutical industry
portend a more favourable climate for PROs in leading developing countries to negotiate the terms of
patent ownership and licensing. As “Big Pharma”48 expands and restructures on a global scale, for
companies wishing to outsource research, universities in developing countries are potentially
attractive options.49
New pharmaceutical manufacturers as potential business partners
Moreover, as new pharmaceutical manufacturers enter the market from leading developing countries
such as India and China, the ability of universities in Africa and Asia to find industry partners is likely
to increase further.50 Developing countries with significant national innovation capacity such as India
now possess a patent system strong enough to attract foreign direct investment, access foreign
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technology *I.P.Q. 322 and encourage local R & D.51 The character of the Indian presence in Africa
has the potential to assist product development. Whatever the infrastructural problems posed by the
African continent, the increasing commercial activity of Indian pharmaceutical companies indicates
their belief in the potential of the market and their ability to capture prospective profits. Indian
pharmaceutical manufacturers are present in all the 53 markets of Africa,52 supplying AIDS, malaria,
anti-cancer and cardiac drugs, antibiotics and a variety of other products.53 The prices are becoming
more competitive as more Indian firms establish manufacturing capacities in countries such as Kenya
and Zambia.54 They are also involved in technology transfer agreements with companies in Uganda,
Nigeria, Gabon, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria. Yet other Indian companies, such as Flamingo, have
formed joint ventures in African countries such as Ghana and Uganda with the aim of exploring the
market.55
At the very least, the rationale that ownership by PROs, as opposed to individual researchers
provides greater legal certainty lowers transaction costs and fosters *I.P.Q. 323 more efficient
channels for technology transfer, should be carefully considered in each case.56 In fact, developing
countries may find that it is more efficient for the government or a state sponsored entity such as a
trust or holding company to receive title to the intellectual property on behalf of academic inventors.
For example, under South Africa's Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and
Development Regulations, if a university chooses not to seek patent protection, the National IP
Management Office will have the right to reassess the decision and if necessary, seek ownership of
the research and patentable assets.57
STRATEGIC PATENT LICENSING FOR ONGOING DRUG DISCOVERY
Utilising the freedom of contract
The intersection of intellectual property and contract law within the patent licensing agreement offers
PROs the potential to reclaim a space for ongoing R & D into neglected diseases that may otherwise
be eroded by the strength of patent law. In addition to the negative rights to exclude unauthorised
uses under art.28 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,58
the patentee also possesses the positive right to conclude licensing contracts.59 Whereas the
derogations from patent rights are narrow, when we turn from property rights to contract, the capacity
of the parties to negotiate mutually acceptable terms begins to change. Within the normative
framework of contract, there is an opportunity for the parties to implement their reasonable
expectations. Contract allows the parties to set present values on probabilities of future outcomes. It
requires a duty of good faith and fair dealing in negotiating the terms of the contract.60
Of course, the final terms of the licensing contract depend on the negotiating power the parties bring
to the table.While PROs in developing countriesmay not have the financial strength of their business
partners, the so-called flexibilities of the TRIPs Agreement, as affirmed by the Doha Declaration on
Public Health, may be invoked to support the *I.P.Q. 324 continuation and dissemination of
research.61 Article 7 of the TRIPs Agreement echoes the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights,62 insofar as the transfer of technology should be made “in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare”, free of conditions, and to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge.63
When a public research organisation negotiates with a private pharmaceutical manufacturer over the
terms of a licensing agreement, the principle of freedom of contract provides a vehicle for addressing
the parties' conflict of interests between the dissemination of research, and the need to recoup the
costs of drug development. The process of offer and acceptance involves the quid pro quo of contract
law and the final consensus of the parties ad idem. When they are “of one mind” intellectual property
law becomes the background againstwhich the parties negotiate and no longer the dominant factor in
negotiations. Approaches to licensing, even for comparable technologies, can vary considerably from
case to case based on circumstances particular to the parties, the invention and its commercial
development. The absolute nature of the rights conferred on the patent holder may be organised to
divide the fields of use of the invention, and to temper the prohibitions on third-party access and use
of the invention with exclusive or non-exclusive licences.
Utilising the forms of licensing
Exclusive “co-exclusive” and non-exclusive licences
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The capacity of licensing to accommodate the commercial exploitation of the patent and the
dissemination of basic research lies in the dual nature of its character. A patent licence is not only a
legal document, but also a way of doing business. Exclusive licences grant exclusive rights to
produce and sell certain products in certain territories and *I.P.Q. 325 markets during the term of the
licence. An exclusive licence permits only the licensee and persons authorised by the licensee to
exploit the invention. An exclusive licence will also exclude the licensor from using the invention. In
this regard, the grant of an exclusive licence is similar to an assignment, since an exclusive licence
confers powers on the licensee that are equivalent to those of the proprietor.64 Unsurprisingly
therefore, in the evaluation of the Bayh-Dole model, there is considerable debate about whether
PROs should grant exclusive licences to the private sector for discoveries that have benefited from
public funds. By definition, exclusive licences limit the diffusion of technologies. The drawback is that
if the chosen licensee does not effectively promote or sell the invention, the patentee cannot then do
so, nor can the patentee grant further licences to others.
Alternatively, “co-exclusive” licences may be granted to a small, limited number of licensees. Such a
licensing strategy has the advantage of permitting competitive product optimisation by motivating a
number of licensees to compete to achieve product development and market penetration or to
develop a product that is an improvement over the original.65 This strategy, in which a small pool of
licensees conduct their R & D in parallel, is especially appropriate where there is a substantial unmet
need for a particular product (such as an urgently needed vaccine). More specifically, such a strategy
reduces the delay thatmight be involved in an exclusive licence,where a failure to develop the product
will require the licensor to terminate the licence, negotiate a new licence and recommence product
development.66
In contrast, a non-exclusive licence allows a PRO patentee to retain the right to exploit the licensed
invention as well as the right to grant additional licences to third parties. Several licensees as well as
the patent owner would have the right to use the patented technology. PROs should therefore
consider the reasons for granting exclusive or non-exclusive licences, particularly in the light of the
maturity of the technology and the organisation's business strategy.
Generally however, pharmaceutical innovation needs one company to invest heavily to commercialise
the product. Pharmaceutical companies, when partnering with a PRO, will normally seek an exclusive
patent licence to offset the high cost of innovation,67 including the investment necessary to the
performance of clinical trials. For their *I.P.Q. 326 part universities should strive to offset the impact
that the exclusive licence may have on continuing research, unanticipated uses and future
commercialisation efforts. University licensors should endeavour to ensure that the agreement grants
only those rights necessary to the development of a particular technology.
Hybrid licences
By way of compromise, the licensing contract between developing country PRO and industry partner
may contain terms granting some rights on an exclusive basis and others on a non-exclusive basis.
Hybrid licence grants can expand the range of creative possibilities for defining an exclusive
licensee's rights.68 The ability of the licensing contract to accommodate a variety of business models
is reflected in the Lambert Model Contracts that were drafted for the use of PROs by university,
business and industry stakeholders in the United Kingdom.69 Each model contract represents a
different approach to the management of intellectual property rights.
“Convertible exclusive” licences permit the licensor to grant an exclusive licence either co-exclusive or
non-exclusive, if a third party wishes to develop products not yet made available by the exclusive
licensee, usually after the initial licensee has been given an opportunity tomarket the productwithin a
limited timeframe.70 More generally, over and above the failure to meet a product roll-out deadline,
where the licensor agrees to an exclusive grant, it might possibly make the exclusivity subject to
defeasance, in whole or in part, triggered by other performance shortfalls by the licensee, such as
failure to meet performance or distribution requirements.71 If triggered, defeasance may take a variety
of forms including the conversion of the entire licence grant from exclusive to non-exclusive; or the
clawing-back of certain products or inventions from the exclusive licence grant, to either
non-exclusive status, or total exclusion from the licence grant.72 In particular, a claw-back clause is
normally used to remedy the licensee's failure to meet minimum net sales requirements.73 However, it
might also be used in respect of any one of a number of performance requirements relating to drug
development and distribution.
A “non-exclusive exclusive” licence grant might begin with the classic non-exclusive language, but
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also undertake not to grant to third parties the right to sell like products *I.P.Q. 327 if the licensee
complies with all the terms and conditions of the licence agreement.74 Usually, compliance is
determined at the sole discretion of the licensor, which is to the advantage of licensor since there is
no need to prove licensee default.75 Licensees are likely to favour a “non-exclusive exclusive” grant
over a standard non-exclusive grant, because it holds some degree of protection against
competition.76
Another variant within the hybrid licence includes a non-exclusive provisionwhere it is not a breach if
the licensor permits a third party to sell like products, but in the event of such a grant, the licensor
agrees to provide the licensee with a reduction in royalties or other previously defined remedies.77
Particularly when the licensor is seeking to get a new process used in a new geographical area by
finding a manufacturing source there, a basic issue is likely to arise over exclusivity. It is usually a
question of whether the licensee is to be guaranteed that neither the licensor nor other licenseeswill
manufacture or sell, directly or indirectly, in its territory. A possible variation is the “convertible
non-exclusive” licence, where if additional expressions of interest are not received within a defined
period of time, then a non-exclusive licence converts to exclusivity, at least within a particular territory
or field of use.78
With a view to the promotion of research in mind, PROs may utilise time-limited clauses in order to
ensure that the duration of exclusivity is limited to the period necessary to afford licensees the
competitive advantage afforded by early market penetration and to permit them to earn a reasonable
return on their investment in R & D, following which the grant may convert to a non-exclusive licence,
allowing competitors access to the market.79 The period may vary from several years for the discovery
of a drug that requires relatively little in product development to considerably longer intervals for drugs
requiring many years of development and testing to obtain regulatory approval.80
PROMOTING DISSEMINATION USING RESTRICTION AND RESERVATION CLAUSES
The WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action calls for “the further development and dissemination of
publicly or donor-funded medical inventions and know-how *I.P.Q. 328 through appropriate licensing
policies …”.81 With the aim of reasserting their traditional commitment to open access and
dissemination in the advancement of scientific research,82 PROs should begin by setting out these
core values in a mission statement. The traditional mission of the university is to serve society as a
centre of higher learning, providing lasting benefits through the discovery of new knowledge and the
dissemination of advanced knowledge. By way of illustration, the University of Cambridge'smission
and core values speak specifically of the contribution the university can make to society through the
pursuit, dissemination, and application of knowledge; the place of the university within the broader
academic and local community; and creating opportunities for innovative partnerships with business,
charitable foundations, and healthcare.83 Such a mission statement can then be incorporated in the
recitals to the contract as a statement of what the licensing agreement hopes to achieve.
By such means the contract provides a structure against which the core values of PROs in promoting
the dissemination of research may be brought to bear on the bargain. The freedom of the licensing
contract means that a developing country PRO has the opportunity to draft terms that allow it to
reserve rights of access and use that are important for the dissemination and competitive
commercialisation of drugs and diagnostic tools. For instance, it might agree to place certain
inventions in the public domain, or alternatively, to create mechanisms for sharing the results and
exploitation of research. By utilising in thisway contractual terms that contain alternative
arrangements, private and public partners can negotiate over alternative solutions to the
dissemination of, and access to knowledge.
Drafting restriction clauses
The principle of freedom of contract provides the opportunity to define a space in which the value of
basic research can be exempted in some measure from the restrictions associated with the exercise
of patent rights. The licensing contract offers developing country PROs considerable advantages, not
least the potential to control production, distribution in time and geographic area. To this end, the
PRO, as licensor, can apportion particular uses of the patent; dividing use of the patent by territory;
and by the number of licensees. The partiesmay test their expectations by inserting
performancemilestones.
Restrictions on field of use, territory and term
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Universities in developing countries might deploy restrictions over field of use and territory terms in
order to encourage development of the technology in hitherto under-served markets.Alicencemaybe
limited territorially or only for certain types of products covered by the patent. By this means the
licensee can be kept to its own territory simply by not granting it manufacturing or sales licences
under the patents of other territories. *I.P.Q. 329 Field-restricted licences therefore enable the grant
of rights that cover only particular products that a licensee is able, and will accept a firm commitment
to develop. This approach protects the licensee's investment in a product,while nevertheless allowing
an opportunity for other parties who are not operating in the field of the exclusive licence grant to
undertake product development.84 A licence that extends to all fields of use for the term of the
licensed patentmay have negative consequences if the subject technology is found to have
unanticipated utility. This possibility is of particular concern if the licensee is not able or willing to
develop the technology in fields outside of its core business.85
Territorial restrictions and their interface with competition law
If the university gives the licensee the security of exclusivity it is normally on condition that it will
respect the exclusivity of others, either licensor or exclusive licensee, in their territories.86 The
question then arises as to whether the licensee is to receive a guarantee that neither the licensor nor
other licensees will manufacture or sell, directly or indirectly, into its territory.87 For its part the licensee
will be interested in ensuring protection of its investment, equipment, employees, distribution chains,
advertising and other servicing that it may have to provide.88 The greater the investment the more
likely the licensee will insist on complete exclusivity in order to provide protection against potential
price differences between territories and the parallel importing that these may engender.89 However,
such contractual terms will be enforceable only so long as the country of import neither treats an initial
marketing outside its territory as exhausting patent rights, nor assumes that first sale abroad by one
licensee implies a licence to export to other countries where parallel patents exist.90
In most countries, national patent laws will give the necessary protection. In the European Union,
however, where the principle of the free movement of goods qualifies patent law, such terms may fall
foul of competition law. The Commission opposes restrictions as to territory, considering the creation
of a common market justifies treating a licence to manufacture in one country of the Community as a
licence to sell in all.91 The Community principle of the free movement of goods derives from art.30 of
the foundational Treaty of Rome,92 which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having an equivalent effect thereto between Member States *I.P.Q. 330 of the EC.93 The
exercise of a patent to block imports is considered a “measure having an equivalent effect”. Article 36
provides that art.30 shall not prevent the protection of intellectual property. But the exclusion of
“industrial and commercial property” intellectual property rights is based upon the requirement that
any prohibitions or restrictions on imports arising therefrom shall not “constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States”.94
As a result we have a conflict between the free movement of goods across borders and the exercise
of patents rights. Various attempts to use patents in the country of import to block parallel
(unauthorised third-party) import of pharmaceutical products that were first placed on the market in
another EU country have all foundered on the doctrine of exhaustion of rights. Generally speaking,
the patent owner has the right to place the product first on the marketwithin the European Economic
Area (EEA), but not the right to block parallel imports from another EU Member State, where the
product has been put on to the market in that Member State with the consent of the patentee.95
The principle of exhaustion that pertains throughout the EU means that the licensor can still impose
an obligation on a licensee not to sell licensed products outside its given territory as long as the terms
of the licence fall within the scope of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption (TTBE).96 However, it
is not possible for a licensor to impose an obligation on its licensee, in the nature of an exclusive
licence with absolute territorial protection, to prevent customers of that licensee from selling goods in
other EU Member States. Likewise, a licensor should not seek to prevent imports from its own
customers or another licensee in another EU Member State.
In Nungesser v EC Commission, 97 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled against an
indiscriminate application of art.81 of the Treaty Establishing the EuropeanCommunity, which
prohibits agreements that have as their object the restriction of competition within the Common
Market.98 Nungesser concerned a licence for plant variety rights (PVRs) in a new form of maize seed.
The developer of the new variety, INRA, a research institute financed by the French Ministry of
Agriculture, had granted Nungesser, a German firm, an exclusive manufacturing and sales licence to
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cultivate and sell in the German market four varieties of its hybrid maize seeds. By way of exclusivity,
INRA *I.P.Q. 331 agreed that it would not grant further licences in the German territory and that it
would try to prevent the seeds grown in France from being exported to Germany, except to
Nungesser.
On the one hand, the court found that, to the extent that the agreement sought to impose absolute
territorial protection on Nungesser, by requiring that parallel importers should be prevented from
obtaining the seed in France and exporting it to Germany, it fell foul of art.81(1) and could not be
saved by the exemption in art.81(3).99 On the other hand, because the agreement was in the nature of
an open licence, that is one which related solely to the contractual relationship between the owner of
the PVR and the licensee, insofar as it provided that neither INRA nor its French licensees would
themselves export to Germany, nor compete with the licensee in the licensed territory, the court found
the agreement compatible with art.81(1).100 The exemption pertaining to open exclusivity was justified
in view of the specific nature of the product in question. The court concluded that requiring INRA to
introduce newly developed hybrid maize seeds, after years of research and experimentation, would
involve such risks in cultivating and marketing that a potential licensee might have been deterred by
the prospect of direct competition in the same product from other licensees.101 Such an outcome
would be prejudicial to the dissemination of knowledge and techniques in the Community.102
Following the decision in Nungesser, the EC Technology Transfer Block Exemption (TTBE) takes
account of whether the parties are competitors and whether the licence constitutes a reciprocal or
non-reciprocal agreement.103 With regard to geographical limitations on production, these will be
considered unacceptable divisions of markets where competitors enter into reciprocal agreements.104
At the other end of the spectrum, if non-competitors are involved in a non-reciprocal agreement, the
licence is normally acceptable.105 At the mid-point of the spectrum, the agreement is likely to benefit
from the block exemption, especially if the licence is other than exclusive.106
*I.P.Q. 332 Likewise, restrictions on the sale of products are not permitted between competitors
where the licensing arrangements are reciprocal.107 In the case of a non-reciprocal agreement,
however, they may simply undertake not to make active or passive sales in the other's territory.108
Nevertheless, in different Member States, the parties are free to engage in passive sales in the
territories of other exclusive licensees.109 The purpose of these criteria is to protect the investment of
licensees. As the ECJ remarked in the case of Nungesser, no licensee would take the risk of
launching the new product on a new market if he were not protected against direct competition from
the holder of the breeders' rights and from its other licensees.110
Improvement clauses
The patentee can obtain ownership or licence to any improvements made by the licensee if a right to
improvements can be negotiated as a term of the licensing agreement. Nonetheless, caution is
necessary. Reservations regarding patent rights in any improvements appear to be a stipulation that
is consistent with universities' core values to promote ongoing research.111 Rights to improvements
may prove problematic with respect to competition law.112 Let us take the case of a PRO that is
attempting to patent and license an invention for the first time. Where the PRO licensor is involved in
ongoing research and development, or the licensed technology is at an early stage of development, it
is likely that improvements will be made to the process or product during the term of the licence
agreement. Because novel technology is normally subject to further development, it is important to
decide the extent to which new information is to be circulated between licensee and licensor. Further,
if additional patent rights are acquired by one, the other party is likely to consider it is entitled to no
less than a non-exclusive licence to the improvement.113 Sub-licensing is a further area where
improvements are likely to be patentable or otherwise protectable. In this event, the licensor will want
the right to use any such improvements developed by the licensee. This right might extend to the
licensor being able to grant a sub-licence to other *I.P.Q. 333 licensees in other territories and may
involve the licensor using the improvements for other purposes. The patentee of the original invention
will usually create a network of non-reciprocal licences, territory by territory.114 Assuming that each
licensee will likely discover improvements, the patentee will normally wish to maintain control over the
technology by requiring not only that licensees keep it informed of any improvements but also “grant
back” by assignment or exclusive licence follow-on patents and rights to know-how acquired by the
licensee.115 However, each licensee will consider this arrangement to its benefit only to the extent that
it feels that there is an exchange of equal advantage. In the contrary case, not only will it be
disinclined to disclose improvements, it may unwilling to discover improvements. In this situation,
without a clear direction as to duration and termination of the licence, there may be difficulties about
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the obligations concerning improvements which one side owes to the other at the date of
termination.116
Even though licensees will likely want an obligation to grant access to future improvements of
licensed inventions, such an undertaking may effectively yoke academic research in a particular area
to a particular industry partner.117 This constraint would directly or indirectly diminish the capacity of
the PRO and its scientists to garner alternative research funding and to engage in potentially fruitful
collaborations with scientists employed by companies other than the licensee, perhaps having a
chilling effect on collaboration with scientists in other research institutions.118 Even worse, if rights to
improvement affect inventions in other parts of the university, then scientists who did not benefit from
the licensing of the original invention may nonetheless have their prospects restricted by an overly
broad clause enabling the licensee to develop the technology.
The PRO should therefore aim to limit the licensing of “future improvements”. When dealing with
improvements, it is crucial the contract define the nature of an improvement and, thereby, what is
covered by the licence and what constitutes a new, independently patentable technology.119 The latter
case, depending on the national law, may necessitate a new licence agreement.120 Given the potential
to reduce *I.P.Q. 334 capacity, exclusive licensees should not receive rights to “improvement” or
“follow-on” inventions without prior consent. As a matter of practice, the licensees' rights should be
limited to existing patent applications and patents, and to no more than those claims in any continuing
patent applications that are either completely supported by information in an existing application or
patent or; entitled to the priority date of that application or patent.121 In the event a licensee is granted
patent rights to improvements, it is essential to restrict the scope of the clause so that it does not
affect unrelated research and is limited as to its future operation.122 In addition, an improvements
clause should be restricted to inventions that are owned and under the control of the licensor PRO.123
Grant-back of improvements and EC competition law
Obliging a licensee to grant back improvements to a licensor on an exclusive basis may be
considered anti-competitive. For example, art.5 of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption
(TTBE)124 sets out the excluded restrictions. If an agreement contains any of these restrictions, it is
only the restriction in question that is excluded from the benefit of the block exemption, not the whole
agreement.125
Article 5(1) provides that the art.2 exemption shall not apply to any of the following obligations
contained in technology transfer agreements:
• any direct or indirect obligation on the licensee to grant an exclusive licence to the licensor or to a
third party designated by the licensor in respect of its own severable improvements to or its own new
applications of the licensed technology;
• any direct or indirect obligation on the licensee to assign, inwhole or in part, to the licensor or to a
third party designated by the licensor, rights to its own severable improvements to or its own new
applications of the licensed technology;
• any direct or indirect obligation on the licensee not to challenge the validity of intellectual property
rights which the licensor holds in the common market, without prejudice to the possibility of providing
for termination of the technology transfer agreement in the event that the licensee challenges the
validity of one or more of the licensed intellectual property rights.
In the case of non-competing undertakings, art.5(2) further provides that the art.2 exemption shall not
apply to any direct or indirect obligation limiting the licensees *I.P.Q. 335 ability to exploit its own
technology or limiting the ability of any of the parties to the agreement to carry out research and
development, unless such latter restriction is indispensable to prevent the disclosure of the licensed
know-how to third parties.126 Best practice is therefore to ensure that there is no licence term that may
be considered incompatible with ECart.81 insofar as it seeks to restrict competition within theCommon
Market by controlling not only what is made with the licensed technology but also the use which is to
be made of it subsequently.127
EXEMPTIONS FOR RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL USE
As ongoing research may lead to new biomedical developments, it is important for the PRO to have
the freedom to explore other applications of the research results. The law has traditionally exempted
universities from paying fees for patented inventions they use in their own research following the
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rationale that universities fulfil a public mission. For example, the UK Patents Act creates two general
exceptions for private use and for experimental use.128 However, as more public research is carried
out with business for the promise of monetary reward, the rationale for such exemptions has become
less clear.
Cautiously, therefore, theWHOGlobal Strategy and Plan ofAction calls upon Member States to
“consider, where appropriate, use of a ‘research exception’ to address public health needs in
developing countries consistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights”.129 The circumspect wording of the appeal is undoubtedly due to the uncertain position
regarding exemptions for research and experimental use in national patent laws. The extent and
status of this exemption differs across countries and is often ill defined. Moreover, the patchwork of
national research exemptions is being eroded by legal challenge.
*I.P.Q. 336 Traditionally, patent laws admitted such an exception for experimental use for the
non-commercial activities of the research scientist in a university or government
laboratory.However,where the experimental use relates to the subject-matter of patents over
successful pharmaceutical products,130 the exemption has proven increasingly controversial.131 Once
it has been shown that a use has been carried out for an experimental purpose, it is necessary to
show that the experiment relates to the subject-matter of the patent. In the English Court of Appeal in
Auchincloss v Agricultural and Veterinary Supplies, 132 Aldous L.J. said that the subject-matter of the
invention must be ascertained from the patent as a whole. For example, a third party who wishes to
test a cure for cancer using a genetically modified mouse cannot rely on the defence of experimental
use against a claim by the patentee of the mouse.133 A researcher wishing to use diagnostic kits
containing patented processes or products to test other subject-matter will need to obtain a licence.
Recent developments within Contracting States to the European Patent Convention (EPO)134 indicate
that the exception may also apply to research that is carried out for profit. Such an interpretation may
have been prompted by the arrangement of the exceptions in the domestic legislation of members.135
However, it is necessary to distinguish between research which aims to improve the invention and
unrelated research activities. Use of the invention for experiments on unrelated subject-matterwill be
difficult to defend. Likewise the defence is unlikely to cover trials to see whether a third party can
produce commercially according to the patent. The English courts have on occasion, been willing to
entertain a broad interpretation of “experimental”.136 Yet it is unlikely that the research exemption will
be held to apply where the defendant conducts none of the exploitation of technology for its own
experimental purposes, but where, the defendant in each instance, is seeking to exploit and sell its
technology to third parties.137 In this respect, English law seems to have recently moved somewhat
closer to the experimental use exception as it is applied in the United States.
*I.P.Q. 337 Recent US jurisprudence, as exemplified by the case of John M.J. Madey v Duke
University, 138 favours a restrictive interpretation of the exemption. In Madey the US Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit took a narrow view of acts done privately for experimental use such that use of
patented technologies in the course of university research should be limited to strictly philosophical
inquiry.139 In the result, in view of the heterogeneous character of modern research funding,
universities will largely be obliged to pay licensing fees for research inputs that are protected by
law.140
Notwithstanding the attempt in Madey to distinguish between a university's “legitimate business
objectives” and commercial applications for the fruits of its academic research, at least two
problematic situations may be identified. First, consider a situation where the defendant conducts
tests and independently discovers beneficial properties of a substance which falls within the plaintiff's
patent but which differs from the product marketed by the plaintiff.141 In such a case, experiments to
legitimately discover further information about the properties of the defendant's substance will be
permissible, but tests to provide further evidence of already known qualities fall outside the research
exemption.142 For example, in Monsanto v Stauffer, 143 Stauffer had developed a market variant of
Monsanto's successful patented weed-killer “Roundup” for which Staffer established tests both inside
and outside a research farm where interested parties could observe the results. The English Court of
Appeal limited the interpretation of the word “experimental” in accordance to its size, scale, recipient
and methodology. Accordingly, the court allowed the defendant to continue its in-house experiments,
but disallowed tests done outside a research farm on the basis that trials carried out in order to
demonstrate to a third party that a product works cannot be regarded as acts done for experimental
purposes.
Secondly, consider a situation where the defendant is testing for new uses and further information
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about the properties of a patented product, including the results of clinical trials with patients.144 In
2004, the EU introduced an extension of the experimental use exception to cover experimental testing
for the purpose of seeking regulatory approval, thus bringing the position somewhat closer to that
prevailing under the US Hatch-Waxman legislation.145 It is the accepted view that the purpose of
art.10(6) of the *I.P.Q. 338 Medicinal Products for Human Use Directive146 is to provide a Bolar-type
exemption from patent infringement in respect of experiments and trials, pre-clinical and clinical,
conducted in pursuance of seeking regulatory approval for a generic or similar biological medicinal
product. Nevertheless, care with drafting reservation clauses is particularly important in this area
because it is not clear which “trials and studies” are exempted. In particular, there is uncertainty
regarding the application of the experimental use exception in art.10(6) in cases where a third party
wishes to conduct tests for the purposes of developing a new drug on the basis that the data may
ultimately be used for an application for a marketing authorisation for that new drug.
There is likely to be greater uncertainty as to the scope of the experimental use exemption in the
sphere of biotechnology, where it may be more difficult to draw a distinction between basic research
and its commercial application.147 It is important that this science, so vital to diagnostics and drug
discovery, should remain open to experimentation and further progress.148 The Gowers Review of
Intellectual Property, commissioned by the UK Government suggested that, in terms of a dividing line,
the exception should only operate in those cases where licences of the existing patent are unlikely to
be given--such as where a patentee is seeking to monopolise further experimentation.149
Draft clauses for the use and practice of the invention
Academic research
Consequently, it is advisable to prepare for the worst case, by considering the definitions of
non-commercial use in light of Madey. 150 Licensing contracts should seek to ensure *I.P.Q. 339 that
universities are reserving rights that are broader than those of an unlicensed party, and that activities
held under Madey to constitute the university's “legitimate business objectives, including educating …
students and faculty participating in [research] projects”, are within the scope of reserved rights.151 For
example for the purposes of such a clause “Non-Commercial Research Purposes” should be defined
to include:
“Use or practice of licensed patent rights for academic research and other not-for-profit or scholarly
purposes which are undertaken at a non-profit or governmental institution that does not involve the
production or manufacture of products for sale or the performance of services for a fee.
Without limiting the foregoing:
(i) ‘academic research and other not-for-profit or scholarly purposes’ includes, in non-limiting fashion,
research that leads, or may lead, to patentable or unpatentable inventions that maybe licensed or
otherwise transferred, either directly or indirectly, to third parties; and
(ii) neither (A) receipt of license revenues on account of such inventions or receipt of reimbursements
for the costs of preparation and shipping of samples of materials provided to third parties as a
professional courtesy, in response to post-publication requests or otherwise in accordance with
academic custom nor (B) receipt of funding to cover the direct and/or indirect costs of research, shall
constitute sale of products or performance of service for a fee.”152
In summary, in drafting reservation of rights clauses and associated definitions, it is important to keep
in mind the relatively restricted scope of the research exemption.153
Rights to use
Similarly, universities should reserve the right to practice licensed inventions with a view to ensuring
that other scholars are able to substantiate scientific data without concern for patents, and that
scientists are able to publish the results of their research in theses, conference papers and
peer-reviewed journals.154 To this end, even when the invention is licensed exclusively to a
commercial entity, PROs should nevertheless consider reserving rights in entire fields of use, for
themselves and other non-profit research laboratories.155 Such a general reservation should clearly
articulate the scope *I.P.Q. 340 of reserved rights to practise inventions and to use associated
information and data for research and educational purposes, including research sponsored by
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commercial entities; and to transfer tangible research materials (such as biological materials and
chemical compounds) and intangible materials (such as databases and know-how) to others in the
non-profit and governmental sectors.156 For example, such a reservation clause should include a
definition of non-commercial use, to read:
“The University reserves the rights, for itself and others, to
i) make and use, solely for Non-Commercial Research Purposes, the subject matter described and
claimed in patent rights and covered by property rights; and
ii) provide to others the Biological Materials;
As used herein, the term ‘Non-Commercial Research Purposes’ means: Use of patent rights for
academic research or other not-for-profit or scholarly purposes which are undertaken at a non-profit
or governmental institution that does not use patent rights in the production or manufacture of
products for sale or the performance of services for a fee.”157
PUBLICATION AND ACCESS RIGHTS
In this section we consider how the terms of the licensing contract might preserve publication and
access rights to the results of research and to new medical technologies. The global network of PROs
shares a responsibility in advancing themedical knowledge of researchers in developing countries.
One of the ways in which they can do this is by preserving open access to the results of scientific
research.158 The success of WHO's Access to Research Initiative “HINARI” depends not only onmajor
publishers enabling developing countries to access medical journals, but also on the extent to which
PROs facilitate early publication.
However, since PROs began patenting the results of research, publication and access to scientific
data connected with the subject-matter of the patent have become a contentious issue. Pre-grant, as
soon as the technology is identified for patent protection, *I.P.Q. 341 the confidentiality needed to
preserve the art in the invention comes into conflict with the goal of the PRO for the dissemination of
research. Premature publication in articles, research papers and at conferences may destroy the
novelty of a patentable invention.159
The licensing contract should reflect the necessary trade-off between the potential for future patent
protection and the ability to freely publish the results of research. By way of compromise, the
competing interests of the parties will typically be addressed by specifying withholding periods for
publication; and providing industry partners with the opportunity to review any proposed publication,
exclusive of the right to prohibit publication.
There is considerable scope for the self-regulation of publication in the licensing contract, as the
following example illustrates:
“Nothing in this Agreement will be deemed to limit the right of the Institution to publish any and all
technical data resulting from any research performed by the Institution relating to the Invention and to
make and use the Invention, Licensed Product, and Licensed Services and to practice the Licensed
Method and associated technology and allow other educational and non-profit institutions to do so for
educational and research purposes.”160
Apart from the problem of jeopardising the novelty of the invention by early publication, there is a
further issue, which is more difficult to address. There is considerably less awareness of what needs
to be done in the period that starts with the first patent filing and ends at most one year later with the
filing of follow-up applications. Researchers may well assume that having secured a priority date
through a first application, they have effectively secured patent protection for an invention and that
they are therefore free to publish their research.However, under European patent law, there are
situations where such a publication may have adverse consequences for the patenting process.161 If
patentability of the original claims appears doubtful, the publication may need to be postponed in
order to allow the filing of a follow-up application with additional features that were not disclosed in the
priority application.162
Post-grant, the patentee will desire to maintain monopoly over the use of the invention. Instances of
restricted access to proprietary research tools (for example, for genetic testing) risks slowing research
and raising costs in developing countries.163 It *I.P.Q. 342 may potentially lead to a loss of expertise
and information among other researchers. One notorious example is the monopoly Myriad acquired
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on BRCA1 and 2 genes. The University of Utah, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the firm
Myriad Genetics co-owned the BRCA1 patent covering the methods and materials used to isolate the
gene associated with susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer. In short, the initial US patent
covered not only the DNA sequence of the genes, and therefore any reproduction, but also all
diagnostic and therapeutic applications.164 Initially, Myriad Genetics was not the sole beneficiary of the
patent. By 1998, however, it succeeded in obtaining from rival patentees all the patents on the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. In turn, this gave Myriad unchallenged control over the main research
materials concerning genes coding for breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility, thereby allowing it to
make further discoveries and ultimately to file further patent applications as a result of such
discoveries. In this case the legal effect of Myriad's US patents was that it was able to monopolise the
data collection, analysis and price of the genetic tests in that country.165
By definition, exclusive licences limit the diffusion of medical technologies. In order to manage the
potential conflict relating to the dissemination of knowledge and the commercialisation of research,
technology transfer officers should consider including clauses in licence agreements to protect access
to the research tools for future research and discovery. The drafting of such an exclusive licence
should specify that the licence is exclusive for the sale, but not use, of such products and services. By
such means the PRO seeks to ensure that it is free to license non-exclusively to others the right to
use the patented technology.166
Further, recalling that patent law provisions concerning research exemptions differ across countries.
In order to ensure that the conditions and cost of basic research remain manageable, technology
transfer officers should seek to clarify the terms of access rights to research within the licensing
contract. Negotiators should consider a series of contractual terms that are aimed at promoting the
diffusion of university research.
Where patent law allows, such provisions may include:
1. Providing for a grace period for protecting the PRO against a publication of the invention before the
filing date. By such means, if a scientist wishes to publish the invention, he or she may do so and the
PRO may still validly file an application which will be considered novel despite the publication,
provided that the filing is made during the grace period following the publication.167
*I.P.Q. 343 2. Making a provisional filing of the patents on improvement with a one-year option for
possible future filing, where the patent office allows.168
The provisional patent application keeps an option open to file patent applications internationally for
one year. The one-year Paris Convention period may be used to conduct further development on the
product and also to test the product in the marketplace to see if the product is successful and if it is
worthwhile to proceed with the patenting procedure. At the end of the one year Paris Convention
period,169 the applicant may proceed to file complete patent applications in foreign countries of
interest.
Alternatively, and to delay the costs of filing patent applications in the various countries, it is possible
to file an “international” patent application, or “PCT” application.170 A further advantage is that an
international patent examiner conducts an independent novelty search and provides a written opinion
on the patentability of the invention. The examination report can provide a good indication of whether
it is worthwhile to proceed to file patent applications internationally.
TERMINATION AND CONCLUSION
This article has been premised upon the notion that the patent licensing contract is capable of
creating some further space for the research and development of health products. Nevertheless, the
asymmetrical relationship between property and contract can ultimately pose risks for the licensor,
depending on the degree to which it may be considered in competition with the licensee. The PRO
licensor therefore has an interest in protecting its intellectual property against internal attack from a
licenseewho decides to challenge the validity of the patent. The simplest means to guard against
such a prospect is for the licensor to include a contractual provision indicating that, upon any
challenge of the patented technology, the licensing agreement will be immediately *I.P.Q. 344
terminated.171 In such an event, the licensee would no longer be in a position to reap the benefits of
the licence and the licensor could immediately look for another licensee.172 Then again, since
preserving the commercial relationship is important to a public-private partnership, the licensor may
prefer to add a clause providing pre-suit notification. This provision would give the licensor the
opportunity to renegotiate the agreement or evaluate the strength of the licensee's claim.173
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The foregoing analysis has shown how patent licensing may offer a self-regulatory solution to the
inherent tension between strong international patent protection and the norms of open science.174
Owing to the conflict of interests associated with the transfer of technology from university to the
business sector, it is necessary to safeguard the mission of universities to disseminate medical
research for the public benefit. In order to address the interests of universities in developing countries
in continued research into local diseases, as well as those of industry partners in minimising the
financial risks of product development, patent licensing agreements need to include appropriately
tailored restriction and reservation clauses.175 While many inventions do notmerit the expense of filing
for patent protection, those that do depend on technology transfer officers utilising an appropriatemix
of licences, and drafting terms that promote pharmaceutical R & D for the greater welfare of
under-served patient populations.
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